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Abstract: The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was identified in Wuhan, China,
in December 2019. As of 17 April 2020, more than 2 million cases of COVID-19 have been reported
worldwide. Northern Italy is one of the world’s centers of active coronavirus cases. In this study,
we predicted the spread of COVID-19 and its burden on hospital care under different conditions
of social distancing in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, the two regions of Italy most affected by
the epidemic. To do this, we used a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) deterministic
model, which encompasses compartments relevant to public health interventions such as quarantine.
A new compartment L was added to the model for isolated infected population, i.e., individuals
tested positives that do not need hospital care. We found that in Lombardy restrictive containment
measures should be prolonged at least until early July to avoid a resurgence of hospitalizations; on the
other hand, in Emilia-Romagna the number of hospitalized cases could be kept under a reasonable
amount with a higher contact rate. Our results suggest that territory-specific forecasts under different
scenarios are crucial to enhance or take new containment measures during the epidemic.
Keywords: coronavirus; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; pandemic; public health intervention; lockdown;
resurgence; forecasting; mathematical modelling; SEIR model
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1. Introduction
On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) a pandemic [1]. This viral infection commonly presents with fever and cough and
frequently leads to lower respiratory tract disease, with poor clinical outcomes associated with older
age and underlying health conditions [2]. Broken out in China, subsequently spread in Thailand, Japan,
and South Korea [3], the epidemic eventually reached Italy, which became the first European country
to be affected. On 20 February 2020, a man in his 30s without a history of possible exposure abroad
was admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) of Lombardy (northern Italy) and tested positive for the
virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 [4,5]. Since then, the number of cases has quickly increased,
with all Italian regions reporting patients affected with COVID-19 and with a marked involvement
of northern Italy [5]. To date, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna report the highest numbers in terms
of both cases and deaths [6]. Several different measures have been put in place, from the closure of
the schools and museums to the closure of restaurants, commercial activities, and in general of public
activities implying crowding of people, until the total lockdown of the country, which was declared on
9 March 2020 [7].
The COVID-19 outbreak had a severe impact on the Italian health services, which had to face and
adjust to the rapidly changing situation. Because of the great share of cases that need to be hospitalized
and of the prolonged hospital stay [6,8], the adaptation of the hospital capacity was a critical issue,
with particular regard to ICUs. In Lombardy, from day 1 to day 14 of the emergency, there has been a
steep and steady increase in ICU admissions; on March 7, the total number of patients with COVID-19
admitted to ICUs represented 16% of the total hospitalized patients with COVID-19 [4]. Over the first
18 days, the COVID-19 Lombardy ICU network, set up to face the emergency, created 482 ICU beds
ready for patients [4]. In the following days, the Italian regions planned to add and create new ICU
beds relying on forecasts of estimated ICU demand [9].
On 13 April 2020, there were 12 028 hospitalized symptomatic patients in Lombardy, the highest
number in Italy, while Emilia-Romagna had the second-highest number, 3490 (altogether, 55% of all
hospitalized patients in Italy [6]).
As the epidemic rapidly spreads, the daily updated great amount of data can be examined using
different types of methods, allowing researchers to closely investigate the course of the pandemic.
In particular, the emerging and re-emerging of infectious diseases have led over the years to the
development of mathematical models that have become significant tools to analyze the virus spreads,
thus contributing to the planning and improvement of strategies to control the transmission of these
diseases [10]. Governments across the world rely on projections provided by mathematical models to
make crucial decisions during this pandemic.
There are different approaches to model a complex phenomenon like the outbreak of a new
infectious disease: the equation- and the agent-based are the most adopted [11]. In this study, we use an
equation-based model, but provide features of both these approaches to highlight the main conceptual
traits of the model we decided to adopt here.
The equation-based approach, also known as meta-population, characterizes models where each
individual is not tracked throughout the model; rather, the population under observation is divided
into compartments and their evolution is modelled mainly through differential equations. The simplest
example of a meta-population model is the SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) model,
developed by Kermack and McKendrick [12]. References for the meta-population approach
include [13–15]. On the opposite, the agent-based approach consists in modelling individual
characteristics as well as movements and contact patterns of individual people, named agents,
within a population under study. References for the agent-based approach to epidemic modelling
include [16–19].
Some authors have been comparing the effectiveness of agent-based and equation-based models
for infectious disease epidemiology. On one side, the agent-based approach allows to capture very
naturally the heterogeneity of the population to give a more precise view of an outbreak and its
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evolution [20]. On the other side, meta-population models provide less detailed information than their
agent-based counterparts but are fairly scalable and can provide scenarios with thousands of stochastic
runs [21].
As the epidemic of the novel coronavirus broke out, an increasing number of models have been
published, and are becoming more and more refined as the knowledge on the disease progresses.
One of the first models to be proposed is an equation-based one [22,23], focused on the estimation
of the transmission risk of COVID-19, its impact on health services capacity and its implications for
public health interventions. This model is of relevance, referring to the first big outbreak occurred in
China, from where the epidemic subsequently spread all over the world.
The aim of our study was to implement the model by Tang et al. and adapt it to the Italian context,
and to forecast the spread of the infection and its burden on hospitalizations under different conditions
of social distancing in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, the two regions of Italy most affected by the
epidemic. This is of particular interest when it is necessary to rapidly adapt the hospital and services
organization and make decisions on containment measures.
2. Experimental Section
2.1. Model Specification
We used a SEIR deterministic epidemiological model, which encompasses compartments relevant
to public health interventions such as quarantine and isolation. As shown in Figure 1, we added
to a SEIR-based model estimated on Chinese data [22] a new compartment L for isolated infected
population, i.e., individuals tested positives that do not need hospital care. Hereinafter, we will refer to
this model as extended SEIR.
Figure 1. Diagram of the extended Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) model adopted
for simulating the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna.
S: susceptible, Sq: quarantined susceptible, E: exposed, Eq: quarantined exposed, I: infectious with
symptoms, L: isolated infectious, A: infectious without symptoms, H: hospitalized, R: recovered.
The other compartments were those proposed by Tang and colleagues [22]: susceptible (S),
exposed (E), infectious but not symptomatic (A), infectious with symptoms (I), hospitalized (H),
recovered (R), quarantined susceptible (Sq), and quarantined exposed (Eq) populations. However,
in Tang et al. [22], the hospitalized are all individuals intercepted by health services as sick, while in
Italy’s organizational system the cases recorded may either end up in the hospital (H) or stay at home
if the symptoms are mild and the housing conditions are adequate (L). Therefore, we have introduced
a new compartment (L) to take into account also this sector (70% of all active cases in Italy as of
April 13 [6]). The model introduced in Tang et al. [22] was then modified by including the following
equations to handle the transmission dynamics from and to L:
S′ = −(βc + cq(1− β))S(I + θA) + λSq,
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E′ = βc(1− q)S(1 + θA) − σE,
I′ = σρE− (δI + εI + γI + α)I,
A′ = σ(1− %)E− γAA,
S′q = (1− β)cqS(I + θA) − λSq,
E′q = βcqS(I + θA) −
(
δq + εq
)
Eq,
L′ = εqEq + εII − (δL + γL + α)L,
H′ = δII + δqEq + δLL− (γH + α)H,
R′ = γII + γAA + γHH + γLL,
where εq is the home isolation rate for quarantined exposed, εI is the home isolation rate for
non-quarantined infected, δL is the hospitalization rate for isolated infected that we assume equal
to 20%, and γL is the recovery rate for isolated infected individuals. Assuming that one in four
tests positive and that 80% of the positives do not need acute hospital care [6], we estimated that
εq = εI = 0.20; we also assumed γL to be equal to the recovery rate for asymptomatic individuals γA
(0.14). All the other parameters were initialized with the values proposed by Tang et al. [22], with the
exception of the infection rate for asymptomatic individuals (θ), which was assumed to be 0.05 [24] as
opposed to 0 (Table 1). In Section 2.2 we provide details about c and δI, which are respectively the
contact function and the diagnosis rate function, both of time variable t.
Table 1. Parameters for the extended Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) model,
Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna.
Parameter Value Definition
β 2.1011 × 10–8 Probability of transmission per contact
q 1.8887 × 10–7 Quarantined rate of exposed individuals
σ 1/7 Transition rate of exposed individuals to the infected class
λ 1/14 Rate at which the quarantined uninfected contacts are releasedinto the wider community
ρ 0.86834 Probability of having symptoms among infected individuals
δq 0.1259
Transition rate of quarantined exposed individuals to the
hospitalized infected class
γI 0.33029 Recovery rate of symptomatic infected individuals
γA 0.13978 Recovery rate of asymptomatic infected individuals
γH 0.11624 Recovery rate of hospitalized infected individuals
α 1.7826 × 10–5 Disease induced death rate
θ 0.05 Infected rate of asymptomatic/symptomatic
εI 0.2000 Rate of home isolation for infected individuals
εq 0.2000 Rate of home isolation for quarantined exposed individuals
γL 0.13978 Recovery rate for isolated infected individuals
δL 0.2000 Hospitalization rate for isolated infected individuals
2.2. Formulation of the Model
The model is essentially a coupled system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations that produce
the evolution of the compartments over time. The model was initialized with the regional data of
Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna released by the Civil Protection Department of Italy on 9 March 2020
(the first day of the national quarantine). Other parameters we entered, such as population sizes on day
0 (9 March) have been obtained by gathering information from other official statistics or making some
assumptions for inputting missing data. More specifically, we assumed that the ratio of undetected
to detected positive cases was 10 to 1, and that asymptomatic individuals constituted 66% of the
infected pool. To check the robustness of our forecasts, we performed some sensitivity analyses by
making different assumptions for these compartments. In particular, we assumed that the proportion
of undetected infected individuals was 83% (i.e., 5 to 1 as opposed to 10 to 1 (91%)) and that the
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proportion of asymptomatic infections was one-third instead of two-thirds. No alternative assumptions
were made in relation to number of undetected exposed individuals and to the case mix of quarantined
individuals, given the lack of available information in the literature.
The initial values are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Population sizes initialized in the extended SEIR model, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna,
9 March 2020. The compartments included in the model are in boldface.
Definition
Prevalent Cases Source/Calculation
Lombardy Emilia-Romagna
Resident on 31 October 2019 (P) 10,085,021 4,468,023 Istat estimate
Deaths (D) 333 70 Civil protection
Hospitalized (H) 3242 666 Civil protection
Isolated infected (L) 1248 620 Civil protection
Known infected (H + L + D) 4823 1356 Civil protection
Undetected infected (A + I) 48,230 13,560 (H + L + D) × 10 a
Undetected asymptomatic infected (A) 32,153 9040 (A + I) × 2/3 b
Undetected symptomatic infected (I) 16,077 4520 (A + I) × 1/3
Tests (T) 20,135 4906 Civil protection
Quarantined (Q) 15,312 3550 T − (H + L+ D)
Quarantined exposed (Eq) 24 6 Q × 0.0016 c
Quarantined susceptible (Sq) 15,288 3544 Q × 0.9984 c
Unknown exposed (E) 2212 513 Eq × 90.277 c
Recovered (R) 646 30 Civil protection
Susceptible (S) 10,013,798 4,449,014 P – Q – E – H – L –D – A – I – R
a Assuming a ratio of 10 to 1. b Assuming that about two-thirds of the infected are asymptomatic. c See Tang et al. [22].
The containment measures have been parameterized via the “contacts” function c(t). We have
assumed that the implementation of containment measures have decreased the average contacts rapidly
to a very low value. This value has been maintained until assumptions of lifting the containment
were made and a sensitivity analysis was performed to indicate the range of results corresponding to
different options and levels of lifting. In keeping with Tang and colleagues [23], the contact rate c(t) is
a decreasing function with respect to time t, which is given by
c1(t) = (c0 − cb)e−r1t + cb
where c0 is the contact rate at the initial time (=14.781 according to Tang [22]), cb is the minimum
contact rate under the current control strategies in Italy, and r1 is the exponential decreasing rate of the
contact rate. Then a contact releasing function was also defined in terms of the release time Tc, namely
the time when lifting of the containment starts (after 60, 90 and 120 days in our sensitivity analysis (see
Section 3). The exponential time scales are given by the constant r1 and r11 set at 1.3 and 0.5 days−1,
respectively.
c2(t) =
(
c f − cb
)
(1− e−r11(t−Tc)) + cb
so that the total contact function is
c(t) = Θ(t− Tc)c1(t) +Θ(Tc − t)c2(t)
where Θ(t)—not to be mistaken with θ (Table 1)—is a step function equal to 1 for t < 0 and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, we set the diagnosis rate δI(t) for symptomatic infected individuals to be an increasing
function with respect to time t using a slightly modified formula by Tang and colleagues [23]:
δI(t) = (δI0 − δI f )e−r2t + δI f
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where δI0 = δI(0) is the initial value of the diagnosis rate and δI f = limt→∞δI(t) is the maximum (final)
diagnosis rate with δI0 < δI f . This assumption provides a measure of the available resources to face
the pandemic.
As data became available, it became apparent that the most reliable data in our possession were
the number of hospitalizations. It is difficult in the development of the emergency to get reliable data on
infected and symptomatic, and even the number of deceased people is subject to changing classification
or failure to classify them accordingly. Therefore, it appeared that the best way to constrain the
model was to rely on the number of hospitalizations included in compartment H. We used a simple
nudging technique to constrain the model to reproduce the evolution of the hospitalizations during the
development of the event [25,26]. The nudging was introduced in the equation for H by adding a term
− τ(H(t) −HObs(t))
where τ is the nudging time in inverse days—the shorter the time, the stronger the constraint.
The results are shown in Figure 2 for Lombardy. These represent ensemble experiments obtained
varying the minimum contacts value reached by the containment measures, which is obviously difficult
to measure with certainty and therefore is a suitable candidate for sensitivity. The values change
from one contact per day, obviously a very strict confinement, to 3–4 contacts, still much less than the
pre-incident average contacts estimated at around 15 contacts per day for dense settlements situations.
The observed hospitalizations are well within the envelope of the ensemble, so the model is capable of
giving information on the worst- and best-case development.
Figure 2. Number of COVID-19-associated hospitalizations in Lombardy according to the extended
SEIR model. The black dots are observations, the red lines are the extrema of the ensemble, and the blue
line is the center value. The envelope of the ensemble was calculated varying the minimum number of
contacts reached by the containment measures from 1.0 to 3.2 in steps of 0.2. Nudging was performed
until 15 days before 12 April.
The model can now be used to predict the evolution of the spread of the infection and its burden
on hospitalizations under different conditions of social distancing.
3. Results
Figure 3 shows the results for Lombardy using nudging until the data available up to 12 April.
The picture shows the envelope for simulations obtained varying the maximum confinement parameter
cb from 1.0 to 2.4 contacts/day and then lifting it to a final value c f . In all cases, the final contacts
achieved have been set to 3.0. The overall dynamic shows that a strict containment (cb = 1.0) is
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capable of reducing severely the outbreak, but for any larger value there is significant tail of cases into
the summer.
Figure 3. Lombardy’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations with nudging between 9 March and
12 April, and forecasting until November 2020.
The amount of hospitalizations is depending on the sustained contacts value c f quite significantly,
but higher values are also sensitive to the duration of strict containment measures (Figure 4).
The duration of the confinement measures in Lombardy was set to a duration of 60 days from
9 March 2020 (Figure 4a,b)—we are showing here the consequences of extending the period to 90
and 120 days (Figure 4c,d). Because of the large size of the epidemic in its early stages, it is required
to maintain the number of daily contacts still to a very low value. The value can be increased if the
containment measures are extended over a longer period (Figure 4c,d), because the suppression of the
infection is more effective and therefore higher values of contacts are sustainable.
Figure 4. Sensitivity to final confinement value and duration of containment measures: (a) Final value
of 3.5 contacts/day and containment lasting 60 days; (b) Final value of 4.0 contacts/day and containment
lasting 60 days; (c) Final value of 3.5 contacts/day and containment lasting 90 days; (d) Final value of
3.5 contacts/day and containment lasting 120 days.
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The situation in Emilia-Romagna is different (Figure 5). In this case, the size of the epidemic
is lower and, consequently, the containment measures damp the amount of hospitalizations to a
sustainable number even when the final contact rate is 7.4, which is only half of the pre-incident value.
Figure 5. Emilia-Romagna’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations with nudging between 9 March
and 12 April, and forecasting until November 2020.
Sensitivity Analysis on Initial Conditions and Parameters
The results of this analysis are presented in the Supplementary Materials. If we hypothesize
that on 9 March there were 5 undetected cases to 1 detected case instead of 10 to 1, the extended
SEIR model predicts a lower number of hospitalizations in the summer for both Lombardy and
Emilia-Romagna—this should not surprise, because the size of epidemic is now assumed to be smaller
in its earlier stages. On the contrary, the initial proportion of asymptomatic cases has virtually no effect
on our forecasts. Lastly, we reran all analyses by varying the initial value of the contact rate, because
c0 reflects social structures and habits that are likely to be different in Italy and China (e.g., family
interactions, use of facemasks, etc.). Interestingly, we found that our results are very robust when the
assumption c0 ≈ 15 is violated.
4. Discussion
In this work, we used a forecasting method based on the number of COVID-19-associated
hospitalizations, which is currently the most reliable information at our disposal, as well as the main
indicator to predict the impact of the epidemic on the health services. These estimates are of great
importance to make decisions and develop targeted strategies during the epidemic.
Our results indicate that the best parameter to assess the effectiveness of confinement measures
and the risk of uncontrolled diffusion of the infection is the average number of daily contacts in a
population (c). Though it is obviously not easy to come up with a totally objective way of monitoring c
in a social setting, it is still easier to conceive ways of doing that rather than the more sophisticated
R0 index of morbidity, which includes individual-specific response to the virus and to circumstances
of the infection. In a general social sense, if we measure c with respect to our pre-incident situation
it is possible to assess heuristically that we should cut daily contacts by half in Emilia-Romagna
(c = 7.4) and by more than two thirds in Lombardy (c = 3) to contain the spread of COVID-19. It might
be difficult to translate this evidence into actual policy recommendations; however, the usage of
geographically located data from personal devices may provide a quantifiable, reproducible and maybe
predictable measure of daily contacts for communities and regions without infringing on privacy issues.
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Such measures could be the basis for informing appropriate policies during and after the incident.
Our results also suggest that Lombardy is extremely sensitive to the number of daily contacts, that is,
if c f increased up to 3.5, restrictive containment measures should be necessarily prolonged at least
until early July to avoid a resurgence of hospitalizations.
Another point that emerges from our analysis is that Italy’s regional health systems can tolerate
different levels of social contacts and still keep the infection rate within the capacity of their healthcare
services. Because we have specified the same parameter values for the two study regions, such
differences have to be found in the different initial conditions that have pushed Lombardy and
Emilia-Romagna in different states from which the epidemic has then evolved.
On 20 February 2020, a case of COVID-19 was identified in Codogno, Lombardy, and in the next
24 h the number of reported positive cases increased to 36; it was immediately clear that there was
a cluster of unknown size and that additional spread was probable [4]. Considering the number of
cases and the advanced stage of the disease, it has been hypothesized that the virus was circulating in
the population since January [5]. The outbreak rapidly evolved, with an increasing number of cases
reported across the whole country, but with a marked involvement of Lombardy and more generally
northern Italy, including Emilia-Romagna [5]. Lombardy epidemic was a few days ahead of the rest of
Italy, and this might have to do with its strong productive structure that led to a rapid spread of the
virus in some industrial areas [27]. As already said, the difference in the number of contacts to slow the
spread is strongly linked to the extent of the early phase of the outbreak in the two regions. However,
it should be recognized that Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna had different initial approaches to face
the emergency, which reflect the different organization of their regional health systems. On one hand,
Lombardy’s strong hospital system, coupled with a less strong territorial system [28], might have
created greater stress on its hospital care services [27]. On the other hand, the strong system of public,
territorial, and community welfare of Emilia-Romagna [29] adopted a mixed approach, based on both
hospital care and territorial care [30]. Indeed, we found that on 9 March 2020 the persons under home
isolation in Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna (L in our extended SEIR model) were 26% and 46% of all
positive cases, respectively [6].
In this work, we implemented a deterministic equation-based model derived from the SEIR one.
We chose this approach because it allowed including most of the data made available by the Civil
Protection Department of Italy at the time of our modelling and computation. As more details will
be made available, the model could be significantly improved. For example, including information
about age structure could result in a new formulation of the system of differential equations to
distinguish compartments of people in different age groups, even in the same state of the disease.
This could also lead to new estimates for the number of daily contacts c depending on the different age
groups considered.
Going beyond the purposes of this study, a mixed approach to modelling that combines equation-
and agent-based methods could be adopted. This would need accurate and very stratified data and
could be realized considering population subgroups, for example in the context of a neighborhood
or a city. In this case, one could experiment with changes among different patterns of interactions
depending on political and administrative decisions. This would have the potential to make rather
accurate “what-if” experiments and provide more operational indications to policymakers about the
“phase two” of coexistence with the virus.
5. Conclusions
Analyzing the burden of hospitalizations under different conditions of social distancing allows
foreseeing the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on health services. This is of crucial importance for
policy makers when a gradual lifting of containment measures needs to be planned.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2077-0383/9/5/1492/s1,
Figure S1: Lombardy’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations, assuming that on day 0 (9 March 2020) there
were 5 times as many undetected infected individuals (A + I) as known infected individuals (H + L + D),
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Figure S2: Emilia-Romagna’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations, assuming that on day 0 (9 March 2020)
there were 5 times as many undetected infected individuals (A + I) as known infected individuals (H + L + D),
Figure S3: Lombardy’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations, assuming that on day 0 (9 March 2020) asymptomatic
cases (A) were one-third of the infected pool (A + I), Figure S4: Emilia-Romagna’s COVID-19-associated
hospitalizations, assuming that on day 0 (9 March 2020) asymptomatic cases (A) were one-third of the infected
pool (A + I), Figure S5: Lombardy’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations under different values of the contact
rate on day 0 (9 March 2020), Figure S6: Emilia-Romagna’s COVID-19-associated hospitalizations under different
values of the contact rate on day 0 (9 March 2020).
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